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Abstract
In this paper, we propose an improved version of the power index related to
the Banzhaf power index for weighted voting systems. This index now takes into
account the mutual persuasion power matrix(PPM) existing among the voters. This
improved index is calculated for European Union voting by basing the PPM on
immigration data among the EU countries. We also provide better approximation
bounds for the Monte Carlo approximation method for computing power indices.
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1 Introduction
In the year 1963 the supreme court of the United States gave the historical order of one
person one vote, several scientists justified the decision using mathematical analysis of
the weighted voting system. The power index for weighted voting systems developed
by Banzhaf in 1965, in the article (Banzhaf 1965), is one of the pioneers in this field.
A good introduction of the theory is the original paper by Banzhaf [8], a relatively
modern approach can be found in [15, 16, 32]. Probabilistic models that construct the
index as probabilities can be found in [33,35]. There is also an axiomatic approach that
constructs the indices through an axiomatization that shows the uniqueness of such in-
dices when a set of axioms are satisfied. There are numerous approaches to streamline
the axiomatization as in [15,18,20]. Let p1, p2, p3, . . . , pm be a number of players with
weights w1,w2,w3, . . . ,wm. A coalition C, subset of the set of players, is called a win-
ing coalition with respect to a preassigned quota q if
∑
pi∈C
wi > q. Let the set of wining
coalitions beWq or simplyW if the quota is clear form the context.
Definition 1.1. A player pi is called critical or swinger for a coalitionC if the following
two conditions are met:
C ∈ W
C − {pi} < W
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Let us call (pi,C) a critical pair when pi ∈ C is critical. Let Ci be the set of all pairs
where pi is critical. The Banzhaf power index for the player pi is denoted by βi (or β˜i).
Ci = {(pi,C)|pi ∈ C is critical}
γi = |Ci|
βi = γi/2
m−1
β˜i = γi/
m∑
j=1
γ j
β˜i, is known as the normalized Banzhaf index. βi, the absolute Banzhaf index will,
however, be our main focus for this article.
The index, though coming to life as a refutal of weighted voting systems, sees a lot of
applications in real life. The applications are numerous in social science [14, 29]. In
Electoral College voting - members of the parliament possess weighted votes in propor-
tion to the number of constituencies they represent. In intergovernmental organization
of nations such as the EU the member countries get their voting weights according to a
number of parameters such as population etc [19,25]. In the context of EU it is a great
debate among the researchers if the voting power game used to determine the voting
weights is fair [25] and often contains warning against such use [19]. In this paper,
we will try to explain yet again why the voting power method used in the EU Parlia-
ment may not be the right approach to find the voting rights, now from the perspective
of the association between the players. It is evident that only the absolute quantity
of the weights measured in economic terms, population, area fail to capture the true
‘power of a member’ since such power should also include the diplomatic prowess
of a nation. In the industry, search engines such as Google use page rank algorithms
applying techniques of weighted voting games among others. From a purely theoreti-
cal point of view the index has generated interests in the line of inverse problems [2]
which is to construct the weights of the players from the indices, or relate the indices
with convex geometry [9] or mathematical extensions [30]. The Banzhaf index has
been a source of great activities recently. The recent study includes an attack on the
computational challenges on the NP complete [31] problem. There have been multiple
algorithms that tackle the computational difficulties of the index [13, 28] or find theo-
retical bounds [22]. A good place to look at different approaches to approximating the
index is the survey [27]. The Monte Carlo method by the [3, 4] uses Hoeffding’s in-
equality to give a very strong approximation within a large confidence interval. In [17]
the authors consider heuristics based on density functions. In [26] the authors employ
generating functions.
In this paper, we introduce an improved version of the power index that takes into ac-
count situations where not only the individual weights of the players are considered
but the associations between players as well. To explain the situation let us consider
a set of politicians discussing a motion, irrespective of their partisan interests they can
vote or abstain according to their personal preferences and equations. One obvious
example is the Indian upper house (Rajya Sabha) debates where the members are fre-
quently persuaded to vote based on issues related to the constituency they represent
not completely complying with the partisan goals. Thus we can often form a matrix of
associations between the players that does not necessarily represent the ideology based
political decisions. In other fields such as geopolitics, we often see the actual strength
of a nation is not merely the GDP or the might of its military or population but also
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the amount of influence that it can exert on the other nations by several means of soft
power. In this paper, we quantify the soft power of a nation based on the association
matrix and the improved power index developed in this model. To be precise let us say
the players {p1, p2, p3, . . . , pm} are engaged in a voting game. And ai j ∈ R are numbers
that quantify strength of the association between the players, this represents the per-
suasion power of the player pi has over p j. We postulate that the strength of a coalition
is not only the sum of the weights of the players but also the amount of total persuasive
power that it holds to sway the motion in its favour by converting other players. Thus
the definition of a swinger is changed so that the diplomatic loss of a player leaving the
coalition is taken into account. In the real life, the matrix A = (ai j) will almost surely
be not symmetric, as the ’associations’ are not symmetric. Ideas to restrict coalitions
or equivalently the critical pairs can be observed in [9] where the authors restrict the
allowed coalitions to those coalitions forming a convex geometry, this is claimed to
represent the EU scenario better. In our scenario, we will restrict the critical pairs in a
uniform way to get control over the critical pairs.
We see a lot of applications in the fields of social sciences and computer science arising
out of the improved Banzhaf power index, we list a few such directions at the end of
this article.
2 Mathematical Model and Methodology
In the recent studies of power indices in voting games, We see a systematic study
to improve the applicability of the index to the practice of coalition formation (Bur-
gin, 2001) as well as studies to improve the computational aspects of the power in-
dices [7,8,27,34]. It has not come to our notice any attempt to propose a model where
a voter’s individual relation (association) with another voter influences the outcome of
the coalition formation. For an example consider a game with six players a1, a2, · · · , a6
wherein a1 has very strong positive association with the other players, then any coali-
tion containing a1 will have negative impact on the other coalition effectively reducing
the total weight of the opponent coalition and increasing the weight of coalition con-
taining a1. Such scenarios are clearly visible in Parliamentary and legislative assembly
election, for instance, members of parliament have strong positive associations with
other members having similar political motives. An attempt using the classical power
indices or current variations of them will not properly predict the actual strength of a
coalition in such realistic scenarios.
2.1 Mathematical Formulation
Let {p1, p2, · · · , pm} be a set of players, with weights w1,w2, · · · ,wm respectively. Con-
sider association between pi and p j as ai j ∈ R, with |ai j| ≤ 1 and aii = 1 for all i. The
matrix Φ = (ai j) is called the association matrix for the players and the goal is to
propose a power index βΦ(pi) which takes the association matrix into account. It is
interesting to note that if all off-diagonal elements in Φ are zero i.e ai j = 0, ∀ i , j,
then calculations for this formulation reduces to a k−quota banzhaf index as studied
in [17]
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2.1.1 Single quota voting game
Consider a voting game with association matrix Φ and a quota q > 0. Let S be the set
of all possible coalitions. C ⊆ S is called a winning coalition if∑
pi∈C
wi ≥ q. (1)
Let Wq = {C ⊆ S : C is wining} be the set of winning coalition. A tuple (pi,C) is
called a critical pair if
(i) pi ∈ C and C ∈ Wq (ii)
∑
p j∈C
w j −
m∑
k=1
aikwk < q. (2)
The improved Banzhaf power index for the player pi is defined as:
βΦ,i =
|γi|
2m−1
(3)
where γi = {(pi,C) | (pi,C) is critical}
One can extend the definition to multi-weight and multi-quota voting systems in the
following manner. We call a vector v = (v1, v2, · · · , vk) non negative if vi ≥ 0 for all i.
For any u, v ∈ Rk, u ≥ v if u − v is non-negative. In k−dimensional voting game, the
weight for player pi and the quota required for winning coalitions are defined as:
~wi = (w1,w2, · · · ,wk), ~q = (q1, q2, · · · , qk) (4)
If we follow equation 2 and vector comparison we can get critical pairs for
k−dimensional voting games. The improved Banzhaf index for multidimensional vot-
ing game is again defined by equation 3. Multidimensional voting games are used in
many real life problems such as the EU election [1].
2.2 Calculation of the Banzhaf index and its Approximation
Algorithm 1 βΦ,i for a k-quota game with an association matrix Φ of dimension m× m
procedure Exact-Banzhaf-Asso(Φ, ~w, ~q)
γi = 0
for all coalitions C containing pi do
if (pi,C) is a critical pair as defined in the extension 4
then γi = γi + 1
end if
end for
βΦ,i =
γi
2m−1
return βΦ,i
Exact calculation of the Banzhaf index for a general case is NP-complete as shown
in [31], so we need to find an alternative to Algorithm 1.
In [4], the authors have used a Monte Carlo method to approximate the power indices
for the players. We extend this idea for multi-quota games with associations. The
approximate banzhaf index for player pi, βˆΦ,i will be estimated by sampling random
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coalitions containing player pi, then calculating the proportion of these samples where
pi is a critical. We assume that each sample has a probability βΦ,i of being a coalition
where player pi is critical, so we can approximate βΦ,i by taking into consideration
several such samples. More precisely the estimation procedure is as follows:
Let C1,C2, · · · ,Cn be n randomly sampled coalitions containing player pi. For 1 ≤ k ≤
n, define a Bernoulli random variable
Xk =
{
1 If player pi is critical in Ck.
0 otherwise.
Now, we estimate the index βΦ,i for pi by using the following estimator
βˆΦ,i =
∑n
k=1 Xk
n
(5)
Algorithm 2 is used to compute the improved Banzhaf indices. The number of samples
required, n, error bounds and convergence analysis is discussed in Section 4.
Algorithm 2 ˆβΦ,i for a k−quota game with an association matrix Φ
procedure Approx-Banzhaf-Asso(Φ, ~w, ~q, n)
γi = 0, j = 0
while j ≤ n do
Choose a coalition C at random containing pi
if (pi,C) is a critical pair as defined in equation 2
then γi =γi + 1
end-if
j = j + 1
end while
ˆβΦ,i =
γi
j
return βˆΦ,i
3 Some theoretical results
Given a player pi let us define two functions h(pi) or simply h(i) = min{h |w1 + w2 +
· · · + wh > q, ∀i, wi , w} and t(i) = max{t |w1 + w2 + w3 + · · · + wt < q∃i, wi = w}.
Note that in the definitions of h(i), t(i) we will consider the weights of distinct players
as distinct wis even if they are same! With this notation in place we have the following
estimates for the Banzhaf index of a player pi.
Proposition 3.1. βi ≤ 12n (2n − 2t(i) − 2n−h(i))
Proof. The set of coalitions that are subsets of the set of players w1,w2, . . . ,wt(w) such
that w1 +w2 +w3 + · · ·+wt < q∃ i, wi = w is not at all winning coalitions so any such
coalitions containing the player i is not a critical coalition for the player. Similarly in
the other side any superset containing the player i, of the set of players with weights
w1,w2, . . . ,wh(i) such that w1 + w2 + · · · + wh > q, ∀i, wi , w is not a critical coalition
for the player as the coalition is winning without the player i. Now t being maximum
and h being the minimum we have the result. 
In the above proposition the greater the variation in the weights of the players better
the estimate from the above inequality. In particular if there is a dominating weight or
a very large quota or equivalently a very tiny quota the estimate provided by the above
becomes close. Other than that it is of theoretical interest as the estimate provided by
the above is not practical. It will be interesting to study in detail such estimates.
Lemma 3.2. Let C be a coalition, w(C) be the total weight of C and q the quota. If
every player in C is critical then w(C) <
|C|q
|C|−1 .
Proof. Let C be a coalition with wi ∈ C, since wi is a critical player for the coalition
we have the inequality w(C) − wi < q or
w(C) < q + wi
If we sum both sides of the inequality we get
w(C)|C| < q|C| + w(C)
Or
w(C)(|C| − 1) < q|C|
w(C) <
q|C|
|C| − 1

Let us define given an association matrix A, and a player pi with weight wi we define∑
j ai jw j = di + aiiwi = di + wi; this number in a sense represents the overall relation
of the player pi with the other players in the set of players. When the numbers di
are all positive for all i we call such game an overall positive association game. Note
that for an association voting game if the association matrix is positive then the game
is also overall positive relation game. In the following proposition we will relate the
Banzhaf index of an overall positive voting game with the Banzhaf index of the related
game without association. If βφ,i denote the Banzhaf index of the player pi with the
association and let βi be the index for the same player without the association. Let us
also define wi + q = qi and let the total weight of a coalition C be denoted by w(C).
Proposition 3.3. With the notation as in the above we have the following statements
relating the actual Banzhaf index with the association based Banzhaf index.
1. βφ,i ≤ βi for all i such that di ≥ 0
2. βφ,i ≥ βi for all i such that di ≤ 0
3. βφ,i − βi is precisely the number of coalitions C such that di + qi < w(C) < qi
minus the number of coalitions such that qi < w(C) < di + qi
Proof. Note that the first and the second statements follow from the third so we will
prove the third statement. Let us define v(C) for a coalition to be 1 if w(C) > q
and 0 otherwise and let us define v′i(C) to be 1 if w(C) − di − wi > q. With these
functions defined it is easy to observe that βi =
1
2n−1
∑
v(C) − v(C \ i) and βΦ,i =
1
2n−1
∑
v(C) − v′(C) where the sums are running over all possible coalitions.
βΦ,i − βi =
1
2n−1
(∑
v(C) − v′i(C) −
∑
v(C) − v(C \ i)
)
Or
βΦ,i − βi =
1
2n−1
(∑
v(C \ i) − v′i(C)
)
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Let us analyse v(C \ i) − v′i(C) depending on the various possibilities in the following
way. Note that if a coalition satisfies w(C) > max{qi + di, qi}, or w(C) < min{qi + di, qi}
then both v(C \ i) and v′i(C) are equal to 1, rest 0 making the difference 0, similarly if
C satisfies qi + di < w(C) < qi then the difference is 1, and if qi < w(C) < qi + di then
the difference is -1. This immediately gives the result. 
In the following proposition we will find a few general bounds for the power in-
dices for a general voting game. Let us define for a set of players with weights
W = {w1,w2,w3, . . .wn} and a quota q two numbers m,M in the folllowing way. Let
m be the smallest natural number such that mmaxW < q and MminW − maxW > q
where minW,maxW denotes the minimum and the maximum weights among W re-
spectively.
Proposition 3.4. With the above notations we have the following inequalities for the
indices.
1. βi ≤
min{M,n}∑
i=m+1
(
n
i
)
− 2n−1
2n
2. βi ≤
min{M,n}∑
i=m+1
i
(
n
i
)
n2n
− 1
2
Proof. Note that due to the definition of the numbers m,M any subset of the set of
players of size less than m cannot be critical for any player since the total weight does
not exceed q and similarly any coalition of size more than M cannot be critical since
removing even the maximum weight player does not reduce the weight of the coalition
below q so the coalitions that are relevant for the indices are of size between m + 1 and
min{M, n}. Now out of these coalitions there are 2n−1 that do not contain the player
indexed i thus we get the first inequality. For the next inequality notice if all the players
are critical in all possible coalitions we have all indices equal and maximum possible.
In this hypothetical situation we have the total number of pairs (pi,C) where pi ∈ C
critical is the sum
min{M,n}∑
i=m+1
i
(
n
i
)
− n2n−1 so now dividing the number by n and normalizing
we get the result. 
Remark 3.5. Note that the above proposition 3.4 is a generalization of [15, Dubey ’79]
as the binomial coefficients
(
n
i
)
in the part one of the inequality above is replaced by the
largest binomial coefficient
(
n
m
)
for m = ⌊ n
2
⌋ and then we sum the index for all i.
Remark 3.6. Note that the lemma 3.2 shows that an assumption such as all players
are critical for any coalition is not at all realistic as it puts severe condition on the size
of the coalition. This also further shows there are much more scope to improve such
bounds by scrutinizing the critical coalitions in detail.
Remark 3.7. For a large set of players with a small variation in the weights the above
bounds in 3.2 give better result in the simulation done in the next section.
In our calculation we have observed that for the relative Banzhaf index βi the following
relation is valid for any voting game. We have not been able to prove the claim yet but
we state it as a Conjecture as it is an interesting and a very narrow bound.
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Conjecture 3.8. Let w1,w2,w3, . . .wm be a set of positive weights, let w be the maxi-
mum of these weights, further let N =
∑m
i=1 wi then the relative Banzhaf indices βi ≤ 2wN .
4 Error Bounds and Convergence Analysis
It is easy to show that the estimator for the Banzhaf index used in 2.2 is an unbiased
estimator
Lemma 4.1. Let C1,C2, · · · ,Cn be set of randomly sampled coalitions containing
player pi and X1, X2, · · · , Xn be the random variables as defined in previous section.
Then the estimator βˆΦ,i is an unbiased estimator for βΦ,i.
Proof. The random variable Xk is a Bernoulli random variable with probability of suc-
cess βΦ,i, so the random variable X =
∑n
k=1 Xk is Binomial with mean nβΦ,i. The max-
imum likelihood estimator for the parameter βΦ,i is βˆΦ,i =
X
n
. Since E
(
X
n
)
= βΦ,i it
implies that the estimator βˆΦ,i is an unbiased maximum likelihood estimator. 
4.2 Confidence intervals
Before trying to calculate, the confidence interval by using different approximation we
first state few results which will help to find the confidence bounds.
Definition 4.3. A function f : Xn → R is said to have self-bounding property if there
exist a function fi : X
n−1 → R such that for all x ∈ Xn and 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(a) 0 ≤ f (x) − fi(x(i)) ≤ 1.
(b)
∑n
i=1
(
f (x) − fi(x(i))
)
≤ f (x),where x(i) is obtained by dropping the ith component
of x i.e., x(i) = (x1, x2 · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xn) ∈ Xn−1.
Several generalization and weaker version of self- bounding (one can refer [10,11]) are
defined by the following definitions.
Definition 4.4. A function f : Xn → R is called (a, b)− self-bounding if there exist
positive numbers a and b such that for all x ∈ Xn and 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(a) 0 ≤ f (x) − fi(x(i)) ≤ 1.
(b)
∑n
i=1
(
f (x) − fi(x(i))
)
≤ a f (x) + b.
Definition 4.5. A function f : Xn → R is called weakly (a, b)− self-bounding if there
exist positive numbers a and b such that for all x ∈ Xn and 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
(
f (x) − fi(x(i))
)2 ≤ a f (x) + b.
Lemma 4.6. The function f : χn → R given by f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = 1n
∑n
i=1 xi is self-
bounding and (1/n, 0) weakly selfbounding.
Proof. Let us take fi(x
i) = 1
n
∑n
j=1, j,i x j then f− fi(xi) = xin thus 0 ≤ ( f− fi(xi) ≤ 1 for all
i. And further
∑n
i=1( f− fi(xi)) = 1n xi = f which proves that the function is selfbounding.
And
∑n
i=1( f − fi(xi))2 =
x2
i
n2
= 1
n2
∑n
i=1 x
2
i
≤ 1
n2
∑n
i=1 xi. Since
∑n
i=1( f − fi(xi))2 ≤
1
n2
∑n
i=1 xi we get the weakly selfbounding for a =
1
n
and b = 0. 
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Remark 4.7. Note that any positive constant multiple of a selfbounding function ((a, 0)
weakly selfbounding) is also selfbounding (weakly (a, 0) selfbounding ).
To draw best estimates and bounds for any random variable when the variance infor-
mation is unknown, Hoeffding’s inequality [21] is most preferable to use.
Theorem 4.8 (Hoeffding’s inequality). Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be independent and iden-
tically distributed random variables and Z = 1
n
∑n
i=1 Xi. If for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Xi is
bounded by the interval [a, b], then the following holds.
Prob {|Z − E(Z)| < ǫ} ≥ 1 − 2 exp
(
− 2nǫ
2
(b − a)2
)
.
Now, we state few basic results in the context of self bounding and weak self bounding
which we will use for finding one-sided confidence intervals for the indices.
Lemma 4.9. Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be independent and identically distributed random
variables. If Z = f (X1, X2, · · · , Xn) and f is weakly (a, 0) self bounding then for all
t > 0,
Prob {(Z − E(Z)) ≥ t} ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2aE(Z) + at
)
.
Further, if f has (a, 0) self bounding then
Prob {(Z − E(Z)) ≤ −t} ≤ exp
(
− t
2
2max(a, 1)E(Z)
)
.
In particular, if f : Xn → Rn is defined as f (x) = Z = ∑nk=1 Xk. Since E(Z) = nβi
and f is (1, 0) self bounding. Then by using Lemma 4.9 we get better estimates as the
followings
Prob {(Z − E(Z)) ≥ nǫ} ≤ exp
(
− nǫ
2
2βi + ǫ
)
and (6)
Prob {(Z − E(Z)) ≤ −nǫ} ≤ exp
(
−nǫ
2
2
)
. (7)
Based on the above results, we arrive a statement to give a precise bound for the esti-
mator and writing as the following lemma
Lemma 4.10 (Confidence intervals). For a given n randomly samples and accuracy
ǫ > 0 with confidence level atleast 1 − δ, the following confidence intervals holds:
a.
βˆΦ,i −
√
1
2n
ln
(
2
δ
)
, βˆΦ,i +
√
1
2n
ln
(
2
δ
)
b.
[
βˆΦ,i − tδ/2
S√
n
, βˆΦ,i + tδ/2
S√
n
]
Proof. We are looking an ǫ for which P(|βˆΦ,i − βΦ,i| < ǫ) is atleast 1 − δ. Since Xi’s are
bounded by [0, 1], so by using Hoeffding’s inequality, the ǫ should satisfy
1 − 2e−2nǫ2 ≥ 1 − δ, ⇒ δ ≥ 2e−2nǫ2
⇒ ln
(
2
δ
)
≤ 2nǫ2, ⇒ ǫ ≥
√
ln
(
2
δ
)
2n
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This proves first part of the lemma. Since X1, X2, · · · , Xn are independent and Bernoulli
trials with mean µ = βΦ,i and variance σ
2 = βΦ,i(1 − βΦ,i). So for large n, and using
central limit theorem, the random variable
X − βΦ,i
σ/
√
n
is approximately standard normal.
If σ is unknown and n is large, then
X − βΦ,i
S/
√
n
is approximately t− distribution with
degrees of freedom (n − 1), where S 2 is the sample variance and defined by S 2 =
1
n − 1
n∑
i=1
(Xi−X)2. Let us denote P(t > tα) = α. Using this notation, P(|X−βΦ,i| ≤ ǫ) ≥
1 − δ implies ǫ
√
n
S
≥ tδ/2. Therefor ǫ ≥
S tδ/2√
n
. Which completes the second part of the
theorem. 
From the above Lemma, it can be observed that the number samples required to get the
accuracy ǫ is at least
[
ln (2/δ)
2ǫ2
]
or
S 2t2δ/2
ǫ2
in case of part (b).
Theorem 4.11. Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn be n random samples. Then for given accuracy
ǫ > 0, the confidence interval for βΦ,i (with confidence level 1 − δ) isβˆΦ,i − 1√n
√
B ln
(
2
δ
)
, βˆΦ,i +
1√
n
√
B ln
(
2
δ
) .
Proof. By using equation 6,we obtain
P
{
βˆΦ,i − βΦ,i > ǫ
}
≤ e
(
− nǫ2
2βi+ǫ
)
.
Using proposition 3.4, and denoting the bound for 2βi + ǫ as B = Bw,q,ǫ, we have the
following bound:
P
{
βˆΦ,i − βΦ,i > ǫ
}
≤ e
(
− nǫ2
B
)
.
Since the random variable βˆΦ,i − βΦ,i is approximately normal distribution with mean
zero.
⇒ e
(
− nǫ2
B
)
≤
(
δ
2
)
ǫ ≥ 1√
n
√
B ln
(
2
δ
)
.
This completes the proof. 
Remark 4.12. The number of samples required within accuracy ǫ is atleast
B ln( 2δ )
ǫ2
.
5 Experimental Results
In this section, we will discuss the comparison of 3−quota banzhaf indices without as-
sociation (WTA) and with the association matrix(WA). In the comparison analysis, the
European Union voting system [36] is considered along with the following quota.
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(a) Weight quota (74% of voting weights).
(b) Population quota ( 62% of population).
(c) Majority of the number of countries (50% + 1).
For our analysis we consider the countries with weights more than equal to 7,i.e, w ≥ 7.
The weight-data and population data can be found in 1 2. The association matrix Φ is
taken based on the immigration between the respective EU countries. We define the
association matrix in the following manner.
Let us denote Mi, j be the number of people migrating from country i to country j
and M j,i be the number of people migrating from country j to country i. Define M =
max
i, j
|Mi, j − M j, i|. Now the association matrix Φi, j defined as
Φi, j =

1 If i = j.
M j,i−Mi, j
M
if 1 ≤ j < i ≤ 18.
−Φ j,i if 1 ≤ i < j ≤ 18.
Using the above immigration association matrix, improved Banzhaf indices are com-
puted and given in Table 1.
Table 1: Without Association v/s with association(based on immigration)
Country Weight Popln WTA WA-immgr
Austria(AUT) 10 8.58 0.03549 0.05554
Belgium(BEL) 12 11.25 0.04403 0.06485
Czech Republic(CZE) 12 10.53 0.04403 0.04681
Germany(DEU) 29 82.30 0.09560 0.12898
Denmark(DNK) 7 5.66 0.02629 0.03317
Spain(ESP) 27 46.46 0.08853 0.10302
Finland(FIN) 7 5.47 0.02629 0.03097
France(FRA) 29 66.99 0.09560 0.11263
Britain(GBR) 29 65.11 0.09560 0.12486
Greece(GRC) 12 10.81 0.04403 0.02750
Hungary(HUN) 12 9.85 0.04403 0.00396
Ireland(IRL) 7 4.63 0.02629 0.03236
Italy(ITA) 29 60.79 0.09560 0.06765
Netherlands(NLD) 13 17.10 0.04418 0.06505
Poland(POL) 27 38.56 0.08853 0.0
Portugal(PRT) 12 10.37 0.04403 0.03527
Slovakia(SVK) 7 5.42 0.02629 0.01762
Sweden(SWE) 10 10.01 0.03549 0.04968
All 18 Countries 291 469.93 1.0 1.0
Now, we consider a random matrix with entries from −1 to 1 as association matrix
between EU countries. The Banzhaf indices with random association (WA-Random)
are obtained by averaging the value of the banzhaf indices over 100 runs, where we
take a new random association matrix in each run and the Banzhaf indices without
1http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/voting-system/qualified-majority/
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of European Union member states by population
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association (WTA) are obtained in a single run. The computed indices are provided in
Table 2.
Table 2: Without Association v/s with random association
Country Weight Popln WTA WA-Random
Austria(AUT) 10 8.58 0.03549 0.04364
Belgium(BEL) 12 11.25 0.04403 0.04509
Czech Republic(CZE) 12 10.53 0.04403 0.04717
Germany(DEU) 29 82.30 0.09560 0.08706
Denmark(DNK) 7 5.66 0.02629 0.04134
Spain(ESP) 27 46.46 0.08853 0.07813
Finland(FIN) 7 5.47 0.02629 0.04330
France(FRA) 29 66.99 0.09560 0.08860
Britain(GBR) 29 65.11 0.09560 0.08013
Greece(GRC) 12 10.81 0.04403 0.04831
Hungary(HUN) 12 9.85 0.04403 0.04863
Ireland(IRL) 7 4.63 0.02629 0.03904
Italy(ITA) 29 60.79 0.09560 0.07439
Netherlands(NLD) 13 17.10 0.04418 0.04785
Poland(POL) 27 38.56 0.08853 0.06762
Portugal(PRT) 12 10.37 0.04403 0.04858
Slovakia(SVK) 7 5.42 0.02629 0.03724
Sweden(SWE) 10 10.01 0.03549 0.03380
All 18 Countries 291 469.93 1.0 1.0
The approximated Banzhaf indices without association (WTA-Approx) and with ran-
dom association matrix (WA-Random-Approx) are computed by using Algorithm 2
which discussed in Section 2. Note that while computing the indices, we use a sin-
gle random matrix and obtain the exact value of WA-Random. and for computing the
approximated indices, we run the algorithm 20 times and then averaged. Similar com-
putation followed for WTA-Approx. Also we consider ǫ = 0.01 and δ = 0.01 for each
of the approximation algorithm runs.
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Table 3: Exact v/s Approximation
Country WTA WTA-Approx WA-Random WA-Random-Approx
AUT 0.03549 0.03540 0.06774 0.06757
BEL 0.04403 0.04428 0.07138 0.07150
CZE 0.04403 0.04384 0.07138 0.07138
DEU 0.09560 0.09557 0.09339 0.09353
DNK 0.02629 0.02629 0.06305 0.06277
ESP 0.08853 0.08844 0.0 0.0
FIN 0.02629 0.02621 0.03484 0.03474
FRA 0.09560 0.09579 0.02633 0.02653
GBR 0.09560 0.09588 0.06871 0.06916
GRC 0.04403 0.04392 0.00084 0.00083
HUN 0.04403 0.04436 0.06967 0.06997
IRL 0.02629 0.02624 0.06383 0.06371
ITA 0.09560 0.09532 0.08334 0.08319
NLD 0.04418 0.04429 0.01747 0.01740
POL 0.08853 0.08871 0.07458 0.07480
PRT 0.04403 0.04395 0.06468 0.06457
SVK 0.02629 0.02617 0.06245 0.06228
SWE 0.03549 0.03526 0.06623 0.06597
The result displayed in Table 3 justifies that the Banzhaf indices ˆβΦ,i are obtained sat-
isfies P(| ˆβΦ,i − βΦ,i| > ǫ) ≤ δ.
6 Conclusion
We have an improved and generalized power index that captures the internal dynamic
of players in real life situations that typically arise as examples of voting games. The
few main lines of future research directions that can be picked up from here are that of
showing theoretical results regarding the index. Better approximations of the index as
in [15] could be also interesting to investigate. In the direction of application one can
look into ways of estimating the association matrix data in real life, and the subsequent
theoretical analysis of the effect of the association matrix on the index. In the third
line we would like mention that with a restricted domain of weights such as weights
satisfying some conditions as in [] is a very interesting future direction. A complete
development of axiomatics of the improved index as in [12, 16] is also a theoretical
problem.
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